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Introduction
The allocation and use of the water 
resources of Central Asia is one of the most 
difficult issues to arise out of the break-up of 
the Soviet Union. In outline the question is 
simple: how should the waters of the great 
Central Asian rivers, the Syr Darya and Amu 
Darya, be used? To generate much-needed 
hydropower electricity in the mountainous 
countries in which they rise? Or for irrigation 
in the energy-rich downstream countries? 
Added into the mix is the fact that due 
largely to over-use for irrigation, both rivers 
flow (notionally, at least) into the depleted 
wastes of the environmental disaster that is 
the Aral Sea. 
In Soviet times the situation was simple: 
major decisions were made by Moscow. 
Independence changed that. Now, beyond 
the issue of how the existing Soviet-era 
infrastructure should be operated (for 
irrigation or hydropower), tensions are rising 
over the proposed construction of significant 
new hydropower projects in the upstream 
countries. Indeed water issues are seen to 
pose a significant threat to regional security. 
In February 2009 Uzbekistan’s President 
Karimov told his cabinet that country’s 
water was under threat and invoked the 
need to safeguard the interests of future 
generations of Uzbeks.1 
As the European Union (EU) noted in 2008, 
water management is the most sensitive 
environmental issue in Central Asia, which, if 
not addressed, could develop into a serious 
security threat for the entire region in the 
medium term. These observations2, which 
1  President Karimov issues warning on water 
16.02.2009. http://www.eurasiantransition.org/fil
es/0637ab0244d56eb6ed8320a2a464add7-84.
php
2  Joint Progress Report by the Council and the 
European Commission to the European Council
on the implementation of the EU Central 
Asia Strategy 24.06.08 http://ec.europa.eu/
external_relations/central_asia/docs/progress_
were contained in a joint progress report 
on the EU’s Central Asia Strategy, appear 
to be coming true: at the time of writing, 
freight traffic delays on the Uzbekistan side 
of the Uzbek-Tajik threaten to inflict serious 
damage to the already troubled Tajik 
economy, as well as to cause disruption to 
an important supply route used by US and 
NATO troops in Afghanistan.3
The aim of this paper is to describe the 
basic problem and the efforts undertaken 
both by the Central Asian States and the 
international community, including the 
EU, to seek a resolution. It traces recent 
developments relating to the planned 
construction of dams, the modification of 
energy supplies and the periodic issue of 
increasingly bellicose statements from the 
capitals in the region. Finally it looks into 
the challenge for establishing a modern 
international legal order to govern the 
region’s strategic water resources.  
The shared rivers of Central 
Asia
Both the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya are 
trans-boundary watercourses. The Amu 
Darya River is formed in Tajikistan from two 
tributaries, the Vaksh River which rises in 
Tajikistan (although one of its tributaries 
the Kyzleu River flows into Tajikistan from 
Kyrgyzstan) and the Pyanch River which 
rises in Tajikistan but which forms part 
of Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan. 
Thereafter it flows through Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan before terminating in the 
Aral Sea. 
The Syr Darya is formed from two tributaries, 
report_0608_en.pdf
3 Tajikistan: Repercussions of Tajik-Uzbek 
Feud May be felt all the way in Afghanistan 
Konstantin Parshin 4/01/10 http://www.
eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/
eav040110b.shtml
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the Naryn River and the Kara Darya both of which rise in the 
Kyrgyzstan. Thereafter it flows through Uzbekistan, Tajikistan 
and Kazakhstan before also terminating in the Aral Sea. 
Although the largest, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya are not the 
only shared rivers of Central Asia. The Chui and Talas Rivers are 
shared between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan while a number of 
smaller rivers flow from Kyrgyzstan into China. Conversely the 
Irtush and Illy Rivers flow from China into Kazakhstan, with the 
Irtush continuing into Russia. 
Soviet experience
During the Soviet period, Central Asia was treated as one 
economic area and its development was planned accordingly. In 
turn, water management was focused on achieving the production 
objectives of the overall regional economic development plan. 
Regarding the Aral Basin, decisions were made in Moscow in 
the 1960s to focus on the development of cotton production in 
the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, and subsequently on rice 
production in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, with a view 
to achieving self-sufficiency in these products. Major investments 
were made in the construction of dams, reservoirs, canals and 
other hydro-structures to promote and manage the transfer of 
water from its sources in the mountains of the Kyrgyz and Tajik 
republics to the main growing areas fed by massive irrigation 
schemes in Uzbek and Kazakh republics.
The borders between the separate soviet socialist republics 
(SSR), which in many ways were little more than administrative 
boundaries within the Soviet Union, were effectively disregarded 
in the construction process. Irrigation canals, such as the South 
Fergana Canal, passed through several SSRs. Dams and other 
hydro-structures were built in one SSR to benefit crop production 
in another, either partially or wholly. Perhaps the clearest example 
is the Toktogul Reservoir. With a total volume of 19 billion cubic 
metres it was formed on the Naryn River in the Kyrgyz SSR 
flooding a large area of valuable arable land in the process. 
Although the series of dams that form the Toktogul Cascade are 
‘dual purpose’ in the sense that the impounded water is used for 
both irrigation and hydropower generation, only a tiny fraction of 
this water was capable of being used for irrigation in the Kyrgyz 
SSR. The remainder was conveyed by canal to irrigate fields in 
the downstream republics. 
Furthermore, the development of potentially irrigable land in the 
upstream republics was sometimes deliberately restricted so as 
to make more water available for the development of valuable 
new agricultural areas downstream. 
Nevertheless, soviet planners and decision-makers did take 
account of the valuable role of the upstream republics as the 
formation zone for Central Asia’s rivers. The costs of water 
management within the upstream republics were paid or 
subsidized from Soviet central funds. These included the costs 
of water resource monitoring and data collection as well as the 
operation of inter-state irrigation canals. It also included the costs 
of constructing and maintaining flood protection infrastructure such 
as embankments and dikes as well as the costs of afforestation 
and the remediation of damage caused by floods, landslides and 
mud-floods. 
In addition, the upstream republics received other benefits such as 
the provision of cheap fuel and electricity as well as social benefits 
to take account of their relative poverty as mountain regions 
within the USSR. In other words, even though the development of 
water resources infrastructure within the upstream republics was 
restricted, their contribution to the development of the greater 
Central Asian, or even Soviet, economy was recognized and 
compensated. 
However, although Moscow treated the Central Asian soviet 
republics as one economic area, this does not mean that there 
was not competition among the SSRs for water. Each of the 
republics sought to maximize its entitlements to water resources 
at the expense of the others. During the Soviet period, the issue 
of water sharing among the Central Asian soviet republics was 
considered in detail on three occasions, the last time in the early 
1980s. While negotiations and discussions took place between 
the republics themselves, the Soviet Ministry of Amelioration 
and Water Resources in Moscow coordinated the process. Final 
decisions on water allocation were made in Moscow, either by the 
Soviet Ministry or the Soviet Central Planning Agency (Gosplan) 
or on some occasions by the Central Committee of the Soviet 
Communist Party. Water resource allocations were then formally 
recorded in a series of bilateral or multilateral protocols between 
the soviet republics. 
In addition, in 1986 ‘River Basin Organizations’ (the Russian 
acronyms for which are ‘BVO’) were established for the Syr 
Darya and Amy Darya rivers to improve the management of water 
resources that were the subject of agreements between more than 
two soviet republics. The BVOs were also given responsibilities 
for the operation of certain major dams and diversion structures. 
However, the Syr Darya BVO had less impact on water resource 
management in the Kyrgyz SSR than in the downstream soviet 
republics. In part this is because the Kyrgyz SSR refused, to 
the extent possible, to cooperate with the BVO, seeing it as a 
mechanism for the downstream soviet republics to increase their 
control over ‘its’ water resources. 
In any event, the net result of the water sharing arrangements was 
that at the end of the Soviet era, the upstream soviet republics 
was entitled to use only a fraction of the water formed annually 
within their territories.  The Kyrgyz SSR was, for example, obliged 
to allow some 76 percent of the water that rose within its borders 
to flow downstream into the neighbouring republics. 
Independence and its impacts 
The independence of the five Central Asian States in 1991 
changed everything in terms of water resources management. 
Administrative boundaries became international borders and the 
Aral Sea Basin became an international drainage basin subject 
to the rules of international law, or more specifically, international 
water course law. 
At the same time nothing changed. The rivers continued to flow, 
the infrastructure remained in place, the need for water was not 
changed, albeit that some of the larger canals were now ‘trans-
boundary canals’ (possibly a new concept in international law). 
From a purely technical point of view the design of the canals, 
dams and other hydraulic works meant that a high degree of 
routine cooperation between the new countries was necessary to 
keep the systems in operation.
Consequently, questions of water use and water sharing were 
among the first to be confronted by the new Central Asian states. 
Straightaway, a further challenge arose. International law was not 
a strength of the newly independent states of Central Asia. This 
is hardly surprising as Soviet foreign policy was made in Moscow 
and the need for international law, and international lawyers, in 
the region was slight. 
The first major attempt to consider the matter at a high level was 
at an inter-ministerial meeting in Almaty in February 1992. The 
outcome of this meeting was the Almaty Agreement On Joint 
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Management of Water Resources of 18 February 1992, which 
affirmed the Soviet-era water sharing arrangements. The fact that 
this agreement was signed by the ministers responsible for water 
resources in their respective countries, rather than by government 
level delegations, has led some to question its validity. The 
agreement also led to the establishment of the ‘Inter-state Co-
ordination of Water Resources Commission’ (the ‘ICWC’) which 
is responsible for the allocation of water in respect of canals and 
structures canals controlled by the BVOs which remain in place.
 A number of other regional agreements followed, many of which 
focused on the Aral Sea. These were followed by agreements 
concerning the use and allocation of the waters of the Syr Darya 
and Amu Darya. One of these was the Agreement between 
the Governments of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic and the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Use of Water 
and Energy Resources in the Syr Darya Basin of 1998. This 
sought to provide a framework for the operation of the Toktogul 
Hydropower Cascade. As Kyrgyzstan can receive very little 
irrigation water from Toktogul Reservoir, Kyrgyz interests are best 
served by an operating regime that keeps the sluice gates closed 
in spring and summer and releases water to generate electricity 
during the winter months. However, the spring and summer are 
precisely the seasons when Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan need 
water for irrigation. Furthermore, releases of water in the winter 
months pose a serious flood risk in Uzbekistan when the Syr 
Darya freezes. The 1998 agreement provided for the conclusion 
of annual agreements regarding the release of water from the 
Toktogul Cascade and compensatory payments to the Kyrgyzstan 
for its ‘lost’ opportunity to generate electricity in the winter months 
in the form of energy resources such as oil, coal, gas and electricity 
or other products or money. In addition, the downstream states 
agreed to purchase electricity generated during the summer 
releases that was surplus to Kyrgyz requirements. 
Subsequently a series of annual barter agreements have been 
reached between the Central Asian States, including with 
Tajikistan, that have broadly the same approach. Unfortunately 
they have had a rather poor record of success. More bluntly for 
one reason or other the agreements have often been breached. 
‘Technical’ and other problems have arisen with gas and coal 
supplies meaning that the upstream countries have been left 
without light and heat. Arguments have arisen over the value of 
the goods exchanged. Agreed water release schedules have not 
always been complied with, sometimes as a direct result of the 
failure of downstream States to supply energy: The upstream 
States have felt obliged to release greater quantities of water 
during the winter months to generate hydropower electricity to 
keep their respective populations warm. 
The most recent agreement was signed in October 2008 
by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and provided for 
reciprocal supplies of water, oil and coal. However the abstention 
of Uzbekistan has made the agreement impracticable: the country 
uses a high proportion of the river water originating in Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan is the main supplier of gas to those countries. 
Meanwhile the river basin organizations still exist, the ICWC is 
still there, but they do not play much of a meaningful role in terms 
of water allocation. 
In any event, what none of these agreements have done is to 
resolve in any meaningful manner the basic question of water 
allocation in Central Asia. So far the basis for the use and 
sharing of water remains basically the Soviet water sharing rules 
as acknowledged, or not, in the Almaty Agreement. The rights 
claimed by the upstream countries to compensation for allowing 
water to flow as well as the costs of maintaining the upstream 
water bodies have been strenuously resisted by the downstream 
states, particularly Uzbekistan. Tensions flared following the 
adoption by the Kyrgyz parliament in 2001 of Law on inter-
state use of water objects, water resources and water economy 
constructions which provided that Kyrgyz water would be supplied 
to downstream countries on a ‘paid’ basis.. And Uzbekistan, 
and to a lesser extent Kazakhstan, has strenuously opposed all 
attempts to equate its natural resources, in the form of gas and 
hydrocarbons, with the natural resources of the upstream states: 
water. 
The withdrawal of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan at the end of 
2009 from the regional electricity grid appears to reduce the 
scope for its participation in future barter agreements. However 
notwithstanding the tensions caused by disputes regarding the 
implementation of these agreements, they have been largely 
implemented around soviet-era infrastructure. The rights of the 
upstream and downstream states, in terms of water use and water 
allocation, remains unresolved but the situation has essentially 
been one of status quo. It is the construction of new infrastructure, 
in the form of new hydropower dams by the upstream countries 
that threatens to substantially increase tensions and the risk 
to regional security. This is where the arguments threaten to 
become serious. But what exactly are the legal rights of the 
riparian states? 
What does international watercourse law 
say? 
International law is the body of law that regulates the rights 
and duties of states and other actors, such as international 
organizations that are recognized by international law. 
International watercourse law is the branch of international law 
that is concerned with the use and protection of trans-boundary 
watercourses. The sources of international watercourse law 
are identical to those of international law in general, namely 
agreements (treaties, conventions), both directly and indirectly 
through decisions of intergovernmental organizations given 
binding force by treaty, and customary international law. 
However, unlike, other important environmental resources, such 
as biodiversity or the world’s oceans, there is no currently no 
global framework agreement in force that regulates the use of 
shared water resources. 
A draft instrument, in the form of the Convention on the Law of 
the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (the 
‘Watercourse Convention’), was adopted by a vote of the United 
Nations General Assembly on 21 May 1997. However it is has 
not entered into force and it is quite possible that it never will. The 
result is that international watercourse law, and thus the rights 
and duties of the Central Asian States over the great shared 
rivers, is governed by customary international law. 
Nevertheless certain key elements of the Watercourse Convention 
are commonly held to be declaratory of customary international 
law. In outline, these include: (a) the requirement, contained in 
Article 5 of the Watercourse Convention that ‘watercourse states’ 
in their respective territories utilize an international water course 
in an ‘equitable and reasonable manner’; (b) the duty of water 
course states to take all appropriate measures to prevent the 
causing of significant harm to other watercourse states, set in 
Article 7 of the Watercourse Convention; and (c) a range of duties 
of water course states to cooperate (Article 8), to notify and to 
consult on planned measures and if such consultations do not 
reach a satisfactory outcome to negotiate in a meaningful way 
(Articles 11 to 17).4 
However, while it is relatively easy to summarize what international 
law says about the use of international courses, applying these 
principles is more difficult. How, for example, to determine what 
is equitable and reasonable? The Watercourse Convention tries 
4 Mention can also be made of the UNECE Transboundary Water 
Course Convention which also recognizes the notion of equitable and 
reasonable use, although its primary focus is on activities that may cause 
water pollution.
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to assist. It calls for ‘all relevant factors and circumstances’ to be 
taken into account including: 
geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological a) 
and other factors of a natural character;
the social and economic needs of the watercourse States b) 
concerned;
the population dependent on the watercourse in each wa-c) 
tercourse State;
the effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one d) 
watercourse State on other watercourse States;
existing and potential uses of the watercourse;e) 
conservation, protection, development and economy of use f) 
of the water resources of the watercourse and the costs of 
measures taken to that effect;
the availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a par-g) 
ticular planned or existing use.
But in practice while these factors offer some guidance they leave 
many questions as to how the issue of ‘equitable and reasonable’ 
use should be applied in Central Asia, as elsewhere. For example, 
the downstream countries have a greater population dependent 
on the shared rivers than the upstream States does this mean 
that they are entitled to a proportionately greater share of water? 
On the other hand the social and economic needs of the (poorer) 
upstream States are arguably greater. Should a distinction be 
drawn between the use of water for food crops and cash crops? 
What of the conservation argument? Uzbekistan, which has ratified 
the Watercourse Convention, has argued that the construction of 
new dams will further reduce flows into the Aral Sea and that 
new dams should be opposed on environmental grounds. But 
on the other hand much of the destruction of that sea has been 
caused by overwatering cotton crops of the downstream States. 
In short, what is ‘equitable and reasonable’ use? And how can 
the notion of equitable and reasonable use be reconciled with the 
duty not to cause significant harm to downstream States? And in 
any event what level of harm is ‘significant’. 
The Watercourse Convention goes on to provide, in Article 11, 
that in the absence of agreement or custom to the contrary, no 
use of an international watercourse enjoys inherent priority over 
other uses. The only other guidance is that special regard must 
be given to the ‘requirements of vital human needs’ although this 
notion is not further developed. 
A full discussion of these issues is far beyond the scope of this 
paper.5 Suffice it to say that international law does not provide 
clear answers to these issues (or indeed a number of other 
specific issues such as the rights and duties of the Central Asian 
States over the trans-boundary canals). 
What is tolerably clear is that the upstream countries cannot 
simply do as they like. The notion of full upstream sovereignty, 
the so-called ‘Harmon doctrine’, is not good law. More specifically 
they are under a duty to inform the downstream States before 
undertaking planned measures, such as the construction of dams, 
to notify and consult with them and to negotiate in a meaningful 
way if consultations do not lead to agreement. But by the same 
token, there is no downstream veto either: if no agreement can 
be reached, provided the upstream States have genuinely sought 
to negotiate, the downstream States appear to enjoy no veto per 
se on future upstream measures. 
In short, international law offers no simple solution to the 
complexities of the use of the shared waters of Central Asia. 
Ultimately the question of what amounts to the equitable and 
reasonable use of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya Rivers can be 
5  See Mc Caffrey, S.C. The law of international watercourses: non-
navigational uses Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001 for a fuller 
discussion of these issues. 
resolved in two ways: by negotiation among the parties or by an 
independent court or tribunal. It is no doubt partly because the 
issue is so difficult to resolve, and so fraught with the risk that a 
‘mistake’ might be made, that the authoritarian rulers of Central 
Asia have shied away from reaching an definitive resolution in 
the form of a negotiated agreement. After all once an agreement 
is reached sovereignty over the water is effectively determined 
for good. The degree of complexity means that there is endless 
scope for second guessing outcomes. No Central Asian President 
wants to be criticized as the person who signed away part of his 
country’s sovereignty, who didn’t ‘get a good deal’, who didn’t 
‘win’, who didn’t ‘get one over on the neighbours’.6  
In these circumstances the status quo, however uncomfortable it 
may sometimes be, probably seems to be the ‘safest’ solution. Of 
course population growth and climate change will sooner or later 
impact the Central Asia’s rivers, but all else being equal these 
are problems that can best be left for the future. The problem, 
though, is that all else is no longer equal given planned new dam 
construction. In other words the status quo is no longer feasible. 
International community
Since the point when disputes over water in the region became 
‘international’ with the independence of the five Central Asian 
States, the international community has in turn been rather active 
in terms of water issues in the region. The primary response has 
been largely through numerous development/technical assistance 
projects focusing on a range of water and water related issues. 
Indeed the region has been subject to a flood of such projects, 
doused with an alphabet soup of donor agencies and their project 
acronyms. 
All of the major multilateral donors have been involved in water 
projects including the World Bank, the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF), various United Nations Agencies and bodies 
including the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 
the United Nations Development Program the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the United Nations economic 
commissions for Europe and Asia (UNECE and UNESCAP). In 
addition to the EU numerous bilateral donors have also been 
involved including the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), the German GTZ, Britain’s Department 
for International Development (DFID), Swiss Cooperation, 
Canada’s CIDA, and so on. Projects have also been promoted 
by the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) and the 
Global Water Partnership (GWP). 
Many projects have, of course been undertaken at the purely 
national dealing with irrigation, drinking water supply and national 
policy programs. However quite a number of projects have been 
regional in scope. Some, particularly those supported by the GEF 
and a number of World Bank projects, have been focused on the 
problems of the Aral Sea. Others, including projects funded by 
USAID, have explicitly specifically sought to develop and realize 
solutions to the main trans-boundary water issues in Central 
Asia. It is of course beyond the scope of this paper to review 
all of these projects. Some of the earlier EU projects, such as 
the Water Resources Management and Agricultural Production 
Project (WARMAP) included an element with a particular focus 
on international issues even discussing draft agreements and 
providing (much needed) advice on international water law. 
Suffice it to say that such projects have not been effective. In 
retrospect it is not surprising that these attempts failed. Of course 
there was and probably is still a need for training and capacity 
building but the problem is that projects take place at the level of 
senior officials. Even when ministers participate there are always 
6  For example the boundary negotiations concluded between Kyrgyzstan 
and China in the later 1990s led to extreme and vocal criticism of the then 
President Akayev in what was at that time a rather free press. 
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limits as to what can be achieved within a technical assistance 
project unless there is sufficient political will. And as described in 
the previous section, that political will has been lacking. 
Moving from directly addressing the issue of water sharing and 
water use, a series of subsequent EU projects have addressed 
integrated water resource management (IWRM) and now ‘water 
governance’. The idea is that by working at the basin or sub-basin 
level looking at national coordination a model of cooperation can 
be developed. Several comments though need to be made. First 
of all Uzbekistan has marginalized itself from these multinational 
projects (and a recent attempt to revive trans-boundary 
cooperation by bringing groundwater into the equation failed with 
the cancellation of a proposed project examining transboundary 
conjunctive ie surface and groundwater use). Second, the current 
EU Water Governance Project is largely focused on water quality 
issues, which are in turn the main focus of EU water law. No doubt 
important, addressing these questions is almost entirely irrelevant 
to the main issue of the sharing and allocation of water resources. 
Dialogues have been held under the EU Water Initiative but these 
two are mostly national level. In short in practice the EU’s policy is 
basically more of the same: technical assistance. 
Of course the EU like any international donor is in a difficult position 
in trying to assist five states (in fact six because Afghanistan as a 
riparian of the Amu Darya has to be involved in any solution to the 
issue of Central Asia’s shared rivers). And of course water is not 
the only factor that falls to be taken into account. Understandably 
the EU is unwilling to be used, to be pushed into a corner or 
forced to take sides. However, waiting until all five countries ask 
for assistance is a somewhat cautious approach and one that 
means that the fine words of the EU’s Central Asia strategy in 
terms of promoting integrated water resources management and 
‘upstream-downstream’ solidarity are likely to remain just that: 
fine words. 
So what happens next and what role could 
the EU play? 
As alluded to above the period of the status quo is beginning to 
draw to an end. Both of the upstream countries intend to build 
new large hydropower dams. 
Tajikistan has made the construction of the huge Rogun Dam, 
which if built as originally designed will become the world’s 
highest dam, a matter of national priority. Where the funding will 
come from is not entirely clear. An earlier agreement that the 
Russian aluminum giant Rusal would build the dam fell through 
in a series of disputes over the dam height and thus the economic 
parameters of the project. While on-going national attempts, such 
as the ‘voluntary’ donation of pay-cheques, by Tajik citizens, and 
the sale to them of Rogun shares, will be unlikely to raise sufficient 
funds, it would unwise to assume that a financier will not be found. 
Russia participated in the completion of the Sangtuda 1 Dam, while 
Iran is contributing to the completion of the Sangtuda 2 Dam and 
may have a further role to play. Russia, and Russian companies, 
are still potential investors and China is hovering in the wings. A 
key factor that must be taken into account is the huge demand 
for electricity not only in Tajikistan itself but also in Afghanistan 
and even Pakistan. Indeed the World Bank has investigated the 
infrastructure requirements for such investments. 
As regards Kyrgyzstan, the intention is to complete the Kambarata 
2 Dam, where construction has already started, and to build the 
much larger Kambarata 1 Dam. Russia has agreed to fund this 
dam on the basis of a huge loan, although there is currently some 
dispute as to whether the loan agreement is still in force. 
It seems that both upstream countries now accept the need to 
consult with Uzbekistan, which has been protesting ever more 
loudly about the lack of information from the mountain states 
and the risks to its very future that the construction of these 
dams would pose. In other words they have moved on from the 
untenable position that as the dams were originally designed in 
Soviet times in the full knowledge of the then downstream SSRs 
consultation was redundant. 
Russia has indeed sought to promote consultation but, as a major 
trading partner with Uzbekistan, and indeed all five of the Central 
Asian states, finds itself in a tricky position, not least if it proceeds 
with the funding of Kambarata I. The proposed construction 
of Rogun provided a good example of the risks for Russia. An 
apparent flip-flop in January 2009 by the Russian President over 
the need for Tajikistan to consult Uzbekistan resulted in strong 
protests Dushanbe culminating President Rahmon’s threatening 
to boycott two important summits in Moscow.7
The other regional power, China, is a potential investor and 
anyway has baggage of its own. China was one of three states 
to vote against the Watercourse Convention and  concerning the 
use of shared Central Asian watercourses, current and planned 
abstractions from the transboundary Iyrtush and Illi Rivers by 
China threaten to have major adverse downstream impacts in 
Kazakhstan.8 
Given the ongoing tensions caused by the use by the United 
States of the Ganci Airbase at Manas Airport in Bishkek it is hard 
to see that country playing a very active role in terms of water 
mediation and the promotion of effective consultation on the 
construction of the proposed dams. 
So does this not leave some scope for the EU to operate at a 
diplomatic level, backed up with technical support, to promote 
the process of consultation over these new projects? After all, 
as the Council’s Special Representative has noted, the EU and 
the Member States have particular experience of the creation of 
effective trans-boundary river mechanisms such as the Rhine, 
Meuse, Scheldt and Danube Commissions, albeit mechanisms that 
are primarily concerned with water quality issues. In addition the 
legal professions of the EU have strong expertise in international 
water law. Of course Europe probably has insufficient clout to act 
by itself. More reasonable might be a combined approach with the 
World Bank and possibly other United Nations bodies, in which 
Europe’s say is not insignificant. In other words there is need for 
pro-active EU diplomacy. After all, as noted in the progress report 
cited in the introduction to this paper, water issues are one of 
the biggest threats to security in Central Asia. There is at least 
consensus that the overall water resources of Central Asia are 
both substantially underdeveloped and currently suffering failure 
to arrange mutually beneficial coordination in their exploitation. 
The pursuit of a sustainable cooperative order, grounded in treaty 
level international law, must therefore be continued, and the EU 
can be a promoter of such efforts. 
7 Najibullah, F. Central Asia’s Great Water Gamehttp://www.rferl.org/
Content/Central_Asias_Great_Water_Game/1379034.html
8  Sievers, Eric W. ‘Water, Conflict, and Regional Security in Central 
Asia’,10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 356 (2002)’ 
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